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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide evidence drawn from publicly traded companies in Greece 
as far as the predictability of going-concern opinions, and other business situations (problem 
companies, tax contingent liabilities) based on a transition from a tax-driven accounting system 
which is characterized by a stakeholder (debtholder) orientation to shareholder oriented and 
independent of tax reporting considerations after the adoption of IFRS. This study examines 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange to determine whether the findings with regard to 
the prediction of troubled companies, going-concern audit opinions and tax contingent liabilities 
are robust in a different accounting system than that in prior studies. We employ discriminant 
analysis and a logit specification to test our models. Results indicate that more noticeably going-
concern audit opinions can be predicted with rates ranging from 96.7% to 98.7%.  
 
Research findings are subject to limitations since they are drawn from publicly traded companies 
only. The selection of models that better fits to the Greek data provides additional evidence to the 
existing literature not only in so far as the statistical techniques but also in respect to the business 
environment (after the adoption of IFRS). These models can act as early warning systems in an 
effort to avoid further bankruptcies or liquidations or even to prevent “window dressing” 
phenomena.   
 
Keywords: audit reports; going-concern opinions; problem companies; tax contingent liabilities; discriminant 
analysis; logit specification; prediction 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he appointment of auditors was optional since 1872 in Greece and became mandatory in 
1955(Legislative Decree 3329/1955) when the Board of Sworn-in Auditors was established. 
According to Company Law 2190/1920 (Article 108) as revised by Company Law 3604/2007 
(Article 42A), companies which are subject to the audit by independent auditors are all corporations and limited 
liability companies that fulfill any two of the following three criteria:  1) total assets at least 2.5 million euro, 2) 
annual turnover at least 5 million euro, and 3) average of at least fifty persons employed during the financial year. 
 
The traditional excerpt of an unqualified audit opinion reads: “In our opinion, the accompanying individual 
and consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company 
and of the Group as of December 31, 2007 and of its financial performance and its cash flows for the year then 
ended in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adopted by the European 
Union.” 
 
In about half of the cases of audit reports there are notes with the most frequent the following statement.  
Without qualifying our opinion, we draw attention to: 
 
Note 5 in the Notes on the financial statements, where reference is made to the fact that the tax returns of the 
Company, for the respective years, have not been examined by the tax authorities as yet and, as a consequence, the 
possibility exists of additional taxes and penalties being assessed at the time when the returns will be examined and 
T 
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will be accepted as final. The outcome of these tax inspections cannot be predicted at present and, no provision has 
been made in these financial statements in this respect.” 
 
Qualified audit reports are usually issued for: scope limitations, violation of GAAP, material 
misstatements, inadequate disclosure, change in accounting method not justified, etc. There are also "modified" 
audit reports that warn users of particular issues. Strictly speaking these are unqualified reports, since no 
misstatements are detected. Modified audit reports are usually issued for: change in accounting method justified, 
going-concern, divided responsibility report (more than one auditor), justified departure from GAAP, emphasis on a 
specific matter. Auditors use this report(s) to draw attention to an important accounting issue or an audit scope/test 
issue. 
 
A pending tax problem seems like it is a disclosure issue (a contingent liability that is not probable and 
measurable so no official recording is necessary but disclosure is necessary). If the statement discloses this, the audit 
report need not be altered. However, if it is material, this could be an emphasis of a matter. In Greece, the audit 
reports are classified as unqualified reports, matters of emphasis, with exception, negative opinion, and qualified 
opinion. 
 
According to Spathis (2003) most of qualifications in financial statements in Greece were of the “except 
for” type of qualification that is given when the matter is a material but not fundamental uncertainty or 
disagreement. 
 
In the literature two types of qualified opinions are issued more frequently: consistency qualifications and 
contingency or “subject to” qualifications. Normal business operations involve many contingencies such as pending 
lawsuits, disputes with regulatory bodies, recoverability of asset costs, (possible)violations of debt covenants, and 
tax status of certain transactions. 
 
The motivation of this study is focused on the following determinant factors with regard to Greek listed 
companies: 
 
1. the very low rate of qualified audit reports(0.69%) in the year 2007 which reduced to 0.00% in 2008. It was 
also 0.00% in 1998,2005 and 2004, 
2. the change of strictly unqualified reports from 58.04% in 2007 to 81.36% in 2008. It was 27.53 in 
1998,36.42% in 2005 and 8.4% in 2004)
i
, 
3. the very high rate of tax contingent liabilities(35.31%) in the year 2007 which reduced to 6.45% in 2008. It 
was 7.62% in 1998, 47.60% in 2005 and 49.86% in 2004, 
4. the increase of the rate of “going-concern opinions” from 2.79% in 2007 to 5.36% in 2008. It was 3.19% in 
2005 and no going-concern opinions in 2004, 
5. audit reports with notes about accounting method changes represent 82.63% in 2004, 30.67% in 
2005,5.09% in 2007,5.73% in 2008 and 69.92% in 1998, 
6. the lack of disclosure of audit and other non-audit fees by Greek firms, 
7. the fact that only one out of every two executives of Greek listed companies has a theoretical knowledge of 
IFRS which implies that auditing firms have been involved at least in training programs to Greek listed 
companies in the transition period to IFRS.  
 
Note that 2005 is the first year after the adoption of IFRS in Greece, 2004 is one year before the adoption 
of IFRS, etc. 
 
This study is justified in a different context than other studies. It is justified in the framework of IFRS and, 
in particular, three years after their adoption. IFRS were effective since 2005 and the date of audit opinions are dated 
in 2007.The contribution of this study is that it provides evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) listed 
companies based on a tax-driven accounting system which is characterized by a stakeholder (debtholder) orientation 
which stands in a transition to shareholder oriented and independent of tax reporting considerations after the 
adoption of IFRS. Note that the debt to equity ratio of ASE listed companies in a time horizon of four and a half  
decades stands on average to 1.24 (minimum) in 2004 and 3.068 (maximum) in 1984 (with outliers excluded).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the review of the literature. Section 3 
describes the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 concludes with 
suggestions for further future research.   
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Audit reports supplement the accounting information drawn from the financial statements. They provide a 
means of increasing the credibility of management disclosures. Thus the combination of audit reports and financial 
statements data can be a good predictor of several business events. The main part of the literature turns around the 
cause and effect relationship between audit qualification and bankruptcy prediction. A series of studies examined the 
relationship between a going-concern audit opinion and bankruptcy and the findings indicate approximately 40%–
48% received “going concern” qualifications one-year prior to bankruptcy. These studies have examined different 
time periods. 
 
Altman and McGough (1974) found that 46.4% of their sample of bankrupt companies had received the 
“going-concern opinion” one year prior to the bankruptcy event. McKee’s research (1976) constructed an objective 
model based on financial ratios to help auditors in making going-concern judgments. He is one of the first 
researchers who suggested discriminant prediction of “going-concern” status, who reported an overall accuracy rate 
of 87.18%.Deakin (1977) extended the analysis to cases two years prior to the bankruptcy event and found that 
14.9% of the bankrupt companies had received the “going-concern” opinion. Alternative studies constructed models 
to assist the auditor in making going-concern judgments. 
 
Building on McKee’s work, Kida (1980) investigated various aspects of auditors’ going-concern judgments 
and qualification decisions given financial statement data. A subset consisting of 5 ratios was selected which 
accurately distinguished problem (troubled) from non-problem firms, representing various characteristics familiar to 
auditors. He has suggested that non-qualification may also be due to the perceived consequences of qualification and 
not only the inability to detect “going-concern” problems. Altman (1982) found that 48.1% of his companies that 
went bankrupt during 1972-1982 had received the “going-concern” qualification one year prior to bankruptcy. Dodd 
et al. (1984) and Elliott (1982) all found that companies receiving qualified opinions report later than companies 
receiving unqualified opinions. As expected, companies that receive going-concern opinions have a longer audit 
delay than companies that do not receive the qualification. This is due to the fact that auditors may be required to 
spend more time on troubled companies.    
 
Several studies examined qualitative as well as quantitative variables to study the relationship between 
bankruptcy and the “going-concern” opinion. Mutchler (1985) investigated the extent to which the “going-concern” 
opinion could be predicted using only publicly available information (both quantitative and qualitative). She 
concluded that qualitative variables that included good and bad news items had no incremental explanatory power 
relative to financial variables in a model of the auditor’s opinion decision for financially distressed companies.  The 
model with the ratios and prior year opinion variable had the highest overall predictive accuracy (approximately 
83%).  Mutchler (1986) focused on a set of manufacturing companies to identify potential “going-concern” opinion 
recipients and to identify factors related to the final opinion decision based on 6 financial ratios with similar results 
to her 1985 study. In a later study, Menon and Schwartz (1986) found that 43% of their companies that had entered 
bankruptcy during the 1974-1983 period after receiving a “going-concern” qualification one year prior to 
bankruptcy. 
 
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1987) present a predictive model of audit opinion qualifications in 
which the variables with the greatest predictive power were a categorical variable indicating whether the firm 
recorded a loss during the year being audited and the firm’s change in residual standard deviation of returns. They 
investigated the extent to which models based on 5 financial and market variables predict whether an auditor will 
issue a first-time qualified opinion in the current year, or another qualified opinion in the subsequent year. The 
results showed that the most significant variables in qualification prediction are current year loss, industry return 
(percent) and the change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Of three qualification types, the going-concern 
opinion had the highest accuracy rate in prediction. Their results indicate that the probability of a first-time “subject-
to” opinion is negatively correlated with accounting losses for the audit year.  
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Keasey and Watson (1987) showed that marginally better predictions of small company failure may be 
obtained from non-financial audit information (prior years’ qualification, current year qualification) than from using 
traditional financial ratios. Delays in reporting for firms with audit qualifications were studied by Ashton et al. 
(1987).They conclude that audit qualifications explain delays in reporting. 
 
Keasey et al. (1988) used the logistic analysis based on 20 financial and non-financial variables to explain 
qualification in small companies. Their results showed that the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report was 
significantly greater if the company had been audited by a large firm of accountants, had few directors, few non-
director shareholders, a secured loan, and if there was a long lag between the auditing year-end and the signing of 
audited accounts. Hopewood et al. (1989) investigated the usefulness of the audit opinion (consistency exception, 
i.e. “subject to” opinion and going concern opinion) in providing incremental explanatory power for bankruptcy. 
The purpose of their study was to explore the question of the ability of qualified opinions to serve as warning signals 
for bankruptcy. Their log-linear approach based on 5 financial ratios showed that the consistency exception and 
going concern opinion had incremental explanatory power beyond financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction models. 
They showed that a qualified opinion was a good predictor of failure. Bankrupt companies were significantly more 
likely to receive a qualified opinion of any type in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy. The results of the 
research provided credence to financial statement users’ insistence that the qualified opinion had the ability to serve 
as an early warning signal for entity failure. 
 
Koh and Killough (1990) constructed a failure prediction model using step-wise MDA based on 21 
financial ratios and demonstrated its use in making going-concern judgments. They have shown that the model can 
detect going-concern problems with an overall accuracy rate of 88.25% which is slightly greater than the auditors’ 
accuracy rate of 86.50%.  Koh (1991) compared the predictions of a probit bankruptcy prediction model based on 6 
financial ratios and the assessment of auditors on the going-concern status. The model outperformed auditors in 
making going-concern assessments and can thus be useful to auditors in assessments. McKeown et al. (1991) 
developed and tested formal models that explain, at least in part, why auditors often fail to qualify the opinions of 
companies that go bankrupt. Their model incorporates financial stress, auditor factors, and client factors, and in 
terms of these variables, it explains the differences between those bankrupt companies that receive the going-
concern qualification and those bankrupt companies that do not receive the going-concern qualification. Since only 
bankrupt companies are considered, the model explains why auditors qualify the opinions of some bankrupt 
companies and not others.    
 
Bell and Tabor (1991) developed an audit decision aid to predict uncertainty reporting decisions with the 
final model containing six measures representing 5 financial factors. Their model predicts a significantly higher 
average probability of qualification for the more serious multiple uncertainty qualification (including going-concern 
qualifications) compared to the less serious specific (asset realization) uncertainty qualification.  
 
Chen and Church (1992) incorporated default status, a company defaulting on debt, as an additional 
indicator and investigated the usefulness of default status in identifying firms receiving a going-concern opinion.  
They also investigated the usefulness of default status in explaining the weak association, found previously, between 
the issuance of going-concern opinions and the occurrence of bankruptcies. A going-concern model was constructed 
based on 4 financial variables that have been used previously.  They found while financial variables were important, 
default status is also a significant variable that can explain the auditor’s choice. They found that adding a default 
status variable to an opinion decision model containing only financial variables, increased the predictive accuracy of 
their model from 38% to 93%, thus indicating the importance of this variable. Their findings clearly indicate that 
firms in default or in the process of restructuring debt are more likely to receive a going-concern opinion than other 
firms.     
 
Choi and Jeter (1992) hypothesize that a qualified audit opinion (consistency qualifications and 
contingency, or “subject to” qualifications) reduces the market’s responsiveness to earnings announcements of the 
firm subsequent to the period of qualification. Ten indicators that could reveal changes in the economic/information 
environment and proxies of these variables that affect earnings response coefficients (ERC)** have been employed. 
(ERC has been shown to be inversely related to the market’s expectation about the amount of uncertainty, or noise, 
in the firm’s present and future earnings numbers and positively related to earnings persistence).  Their results are 
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consistent with the hypothesis that ERCs are altered subsequent to the issuance of a qualified audit opinion.  For 
both consistency qualifications stemming from discretionary changes in accounting principles and “subject to” 
qualifications (without mentioning the going-concern violation), the post-qualification ERC declined significantly.  
 
Louder et al. (1992) using a standardized cumulative abnormal returns model with market expectation, 
unexpected earnings and lateness as independent variables showed that when the market is not expecting a qualified 
opinion, there is a negative reaction on the qualification announcement date, and when the market is expecting a 
qualification and it is not announced at the earnings announcement date, there is a negative effect on security returns 
at the earnings announcement date.  Goodman et al. (1995) found that particular combinations of specific non-
financial data could accurately discriminate between those firms receiving and those not receiving going-concern 
modifications to the audit report. Sundgren (1998) has shown that audit reports include only marginal additional 
information over financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction.  He studied 315 non-failing Finnish firms and found that 
in 91% the audit report followed the standard form. The same percentage among 127 failing companies was as low 
as 53%.Their results show that non-professional auditors are less likely to qualify the report but there are no 
significant differences between the other types of auditors. 
 
Mutchler et al. (1997) developed a list of 82 potential good news items, and found different results in an 
extension of the 1985 study. They studied how qualitative information released in the Wall Street Journal Index, 
specifically payment defaults and debt covenant violations, affected the probability of a company receiving a 
“going-concern modified report”. All the companies in their sample were in the category of “soon to be entering 
bankruptcy”. They found that the bad news items of payment default and debt covenant violation were significantly 
associated with issuance of the “going-concern modified report” by the auditor. They also found that the probability 
of bankruptcy was also significantly associated with the “going-concern” report.     
 
Laitinen et al. (1998) showed that the qualification of an audit report is mainly associated with poor 
profitability, high indebtedness and low growth. The qualification decision was explained by 16 financial ratios and 
by the audit lag. The logistic model showed that the likelihood of receiving a qualification by large Finnish 
companies is larger, the lower the growth of the firm, the lower the share of equity in the balance-sheet and the 
smaller the number of employees. 
 
Bartov et al. (2001) assert that auditors may be more likely to issue qualified reports for firms with extreme 
earnings, perhaps to mitigate litigation risk. Their analysis followed because “Big Six auditors” are identified in the 
literature as higher quality auditors due to their technological capacity of detecting earnings management, and once 
detected, a higher probability of reporting it.  
 
Spathis (2003) developed a model based on financial information and other indicators such as firm 
litigation, to explain qualifications in audit reports of Greek companies. His results clearly indicate that firm 
litigation, financial distress and current year losses are the major indicators of audit qualification opinion. Models 
are accurate in classifying the total sample of 50 qualifications and 50 without qualifications correctly with accuracy 
rates of approximately 78% and 75% (logistic and OLS models). Caramanis and Spathis (2006) using a sample of 
185 Greek companies listed at the Athens Stock Exchange and analyzed with a logistic and OLS regression models 
tested the extent to which combinations of financial information with non-financial variables, such as audit fees and 
type of audit firm, can be used as predictors of audit qualifications. On the contrary, good predictors are some 
financial variables (Operating Income/Total Assets and, current ratio).   
 
Gaganis et al. (2007) proposed the application of probabilistic neural networks (PNNs) that combine the 
computational power and flexibility of artificial neural networks (ANNs) in a sample of 264 financial statements 
that received a qualified audit opinion over the period 1997-2004 and 3069 unqualified ones from 881 firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange using a set of variables that consist of absolute measures, financial ratios and 
nonfinancial information. Their results indicate the high explanatory power of the PNN model in explaining 
qualifications in audit reports. Martens et al. (2008) using more advanced data mining techniques such as support 
vector machines and rule-based classifiers, they empirically investigated sampling methodology issues. They infer 
rules with the state-of-the-art classification technique AntMiner
+
, which are subsequently converted into a decision 
table allowing for truly easy and user-friendly consultation in every day audit business practices.    
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Prior studies have employed a variety of methodologies. This study examines companies listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange to determine whether the findings in other countries are robust when Greek listed 
companies are examined.  
 
Sample Selection And Data Used 
 
Companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) have been selected for investigation in this study. 
The size of the sample is based on the number of firms appeared in the Internet in the year 2007, that is three years 
after the adoption of IFRS. 
 
The total number of firms included in the final sample is 286 companies that have announced audit reports 
in the year 2007.Eleven companies have been deleted because they do not present a series of financial statements for 
two consecutive years before the announcement of the audit report. Thus far, 275 companies are included in the final 
sample. As it has been mentioned only two companies exhibit a qualification (0.72%), that is, one company has a 
strictly qualified report and the second has a going concern opinion that has been classified as a qualified opinion. 
Companies with tax contingent liabilities represent 35.27%, companies with going-concern opinions represent 
3.27%, companies with change in accounting methods represent 5.09%, companies with legal disputes represent 
1.45%, among other notes (i.e. debt restructuring,  overdue debt, etc.).  
 
Research Method Used 
 
Discriminant analysis and logit models have been employed in this study. Discriminant analysis and logit 
were performed with type of opinion as the dependent variable and eleven financial ratios as independent variables. 
 
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique used for predicting group membership on the basis of the 
values on a set of predictors’ variables. It operates with the conditional distribution of x (explanatory variables) 
given y (dependent variable).  The model has the following general form: 
 
Yi=1 if P (Yi=0/Xi
*
)L01< P (Yi=1/Xi
*
)L01 
 
Yi=0 otherwise 
 
Where 
 
P(Yi=1/Xi
*
) as a posterior probability of Yi=1. 
 
A logit model specifies the conditional distribution of y given x. It assumes that g(x)=logit{P(x)} is the 
linear function of covariates (x) of the i
th
 subject with the logit as the dependent variable. Specifically, 
 
g (x)=a+bx with 
 
                   a+bx  
                e 
   P(x)=--------------------- 
                       a+bx 
                1+e 
 
where P(x) denotes the conditional probability that Y occurs, conditional that it did not occur.  In other words, 
P(x)=P(Y=1/Y=0) with Y denoting the outcome variable.  
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The strict statistical assumptions set up by Palepu (1986), Karels and Prakash (1987), and Maddala (1991) 
are: 
 
1. the equal probability distributed between the two groups of companies, and the efficiency of each model 
using different data; 
2. further statistical implications related to the unequal sampling rates and, 
3. the stability of discrete models overtime. 
 
Variables Selection 
 
Variables have been selected with the purpose of sketching an overall picture of a company’s profile and 
according to the models used in the literature (see Appendix I; Maggina, 2008).  Eleven variables have been 
included in each model.  They have as follows: 
 
X1 Net Income/Total Assets (return on assets) 
X2 Cash/Current Liabilities (liquidity ratio) 
X3 Cash/Total Assets (liquidity ratio) 
X4 Quick Assets/Total Assets (quick ratio) 
X5 Current Assets/Sales (return of current assets on sales) 
X6 Net Worth/Total Debt (equity to debt ratio) 
X7 Receivables/Inventories (short-term financial ratio) 
X8 Working Capital/Total Assets (working capital percentage on total assets) 
X9 Total Debt/Total Assets (leverage ratio) 
X10 Net Income/Sales (return on sales ratio) 
X11 Sales/Working Capital (working capital turnover)   
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
Problem (Troubled) Companies 
 
According to Mutchler (1985), auditors must first identify problem (troubled) companies and then decide 
whether to issue a going-concern opinion. Problem companies are defined as those that meet at least one of the 
following criteria (Chen and Church, 1992): 
 
1. negative net worth, 
2. negative cash flows, 
3. negative operating income, 
4. negative working capital, 
5. negative net income, 
6. negative retained earnings. 
 
In this study, we define as problem (troubled) companies those that have negative net income for two 
consecutive years.  They are 46 companies.  They are composed of 18 companies with strictly unqualified reports 
and 20 companies with tax contingent liabilities.  Two companies have qualified reports, six companies have going-
concern opinions, one company has matters of emphasis, and nineteen companies have tax contingent liabilities.  
Other reasons for notes are overdue liabilities, financial restructuring, negative net equity and, inventory valuation.  
 
In a consideration of means of each variable used in the analysis, results are more illustrative of the 
differences between groups of companies. As close as we go a concern appears with variables X7, X2, X11, X6 and 
X10.  Obviously, this is an evidence that Receivables/Inventories, Cash/Current Liabilities, Sales/Working Capital, 
Net Worth/Total Debt and, Net Income/Sales are the most crucial variables in the discriminating process as well as 
the predictive ability of models employed in this study (Descriptive statistics are available upon request).    
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A non-parametric method and a suitable one for ordinal data specifies the most significant variables at 5% 
level of significance.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov is an appropriate statistic to test normality. It is of high importance to 
test normality because outliers may have a big influence.  Prior studies have shown that non-normally distributed 
financial ratios are characterized with the presence of outliers. Most outliers are presented for variables X7 
(Receivables/Inventories) and X11 (Sales/Working Capital) for problem companies and X7 (Working Capital/Total 
Assets), X11(Sales/Working Capital), X6 (Net Worth/Total Debt) and X2 (Cash/Current Liabilities) for non-problem 
companies. 
 
All variables in non-problem companies are non-normally distributed.  The same happens with problem 
companies except for variable X4 (Quick Assets/Total Assets).  Normality statistics are available upon request. 
 
The choice of the best fitting model is stressed through a discussion of all empirical findings drawn from a 
test of discriminant and logit analysis. Coefficients for each model and for each variable are given below:  
 
Table 1: Regression Coefficients (All Data) 
Panel A: All Data 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 -0.077 -37.171 
X2 -0.042 0.032 
X3 0.051 2.985 
X4 -0.154 0.045 
X5 0.037 -0.028 
X6 -0.010 -0.176 
X7 0.050 0.000 
X8 0.712 -1.354 
X9 0.068 -1.002 
X10 0.693 -1.082 
X11 0.158 -0.964 
 Eigenvalue = 0.182 
Correlation = 0.393 
Wilk' Lamda = 0.846 
X
2 = 78.162 
Significance = 0.000 
X
2 = 207.111 
Significance = 0.000 
Wald Test = 159.794 
 
 
Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 -0.210 -35.005 
X2 -0.144 0.055 
X3 0.237 1.313 
X4 -0.260  0.519 
X5 -0.141 0.810 
X6 -0.100 -0.020 
X7 0.270 -0.113 
X8 0.738  -1.108 
X9 0.013 -0.208 
X10 0.635 -1.544 
X11 0.376 -0.048 
 Eigenvalue = 0.252 
Correlation = 0.449 
Wilk' Lamda = 0.799 
X
2 
= 82.856 
Significance = 0.000 
X
2 
= 157.056 
Significance = 0.000 
Wald Test = 137.718 
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 Wilks' Lamda which is one of the various statistics available is used to test the significance of the 
discriminant function as a whole. As shown in Table 1 the significant lamda means that the null hypothesis (that the 
two groups have the same mean discriminant function scores) can be rejected and conclude that the model is 
discriminating. In discriminant analysis, almost all variables contribute marginally (see Table 1). In contrast, 
variables X1 (Net Income/Total Assets), X3 (Cash/ Total Assets), X8 (Working Capital/Total Assets), X9 (Total 
Debt/Total Assets) and X10 (Net Income/Sales) are the most differentiating variables in case a logit model. 
 
 Furthermore, the low eigenvalue means that each variable alone cannot sufficiently explain the model. In 
discriminant analysis the significance of the test is a strong evidence which leads to the selection of the best 
statistical technique. 
 
 Once the values of the discriminant coefficients are estimated, it is possible to calculate discriminant scores 
for each observation in the sample, or any firm, and to assign the observations to one of the groups based on this 
score. The essence of this procedure is to compare the profile of an individual firm with that of the alternative 
groupings. In this manner, the firm is assigned to the group it is most closely resembles.     
 
 As far as the correct classification, results offered in next Table 2 justify the preference of logit against 
discriminant analysis. Problem companies are more correctly classified using logit. 
 
 
Table 2: Classification Table For GROUP (Percent Correct-Overall Index) 
 
Panel A: All Data 
Discriminant Analysis Logit Model 
332(85.6) 56(14.4) 377 11(97.2) 
39(45.3) 47(54.7) 36 50(58.1) 
80.00% 90.10% 
 
Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
  
276(88.3) 39(11.7) 308 7(97.8) 
25(42.6) 36(57.4) 26 35(57.4) 
83.00% 91.20% 
 
 
 This finding is very close to other business paradigms (i.e. bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, etc.).It is 
worth noting that percentage of correctly classified companies is much lower in other fields of business research such 
as acquired versus non-acquired companies when percentage ranges around 76% and 73% in discriminant and logit 
analysis, respectively.   
 
 Based on the above empirical findings, it is suggested that the prediction model is an accurate forecast of 
problem companies. 
 
GOING-CONCERN OPINIONS 
 
Going-concern opinions can be predicted successfully using financial variables. According to 
Carmichael(1972) elements pointing to going-concern problems have as follows:  A) Financial problems (liquidity 
deficiency, equity deficiency, debt default, funds shortage), and B) operating problems (continued operating losses, 
prospective revenues doubtful, ability to operate is jeopardized, poor control over operations).   
 
In this study there are nine companies with going-concern opinions. Almost all going-concern opinions 
have been issued by SOL (the former Sworn-in-Auditors, the former state-controlled Board) and no company with 
going-concern opinion reports the Board of Directors’ size and composition. When considering the means of each 
variable used in the analysis, we see that results are more illustrative of the differences between groups of 
companies. Differences between the two groups of companies, that is, companies with and without going-concern 
opinions are more apparent for variables X7 (Receivables/Inventories), X2 (Cash/Current Liabilities), X11 
(Sales/Working Capital), X6 (Net Worth/Total Debt), and X10 (Net Income/Sales).  Descriptive statistics are 
available upon request. 
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In a consideration of normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov z-statistic it is shown that except variable X1 
(Net Income/Total Assets) all other variables for companies with going-concern opinions are almost normally 
distributed in case of either all data or with outliers omitted .In contrast, all variables are not normally distributed in 
case of companies without going-concern opinions. It is worth noting that almost all variables of companies with 
going-concern opinions do not have outliers (except variable X1 (Net Income/Total Assets) with four outliers). In 
adverse, companies without going-concern opinions exhibit a great number of outliers in case of variables X11 
(Sales/Working Capital), X7 (Receivables /Inventories), X2 (Cash/Current Liabilities), and X6 (Net Worth/Total Debt.  
Normality statistics are available upon request. 
 
Coefficients for each model and for each variable indicate that the most discriminating variables are X8 
(Working Capital/Total Assets) and X4 (Quick Ratio) when using all data while all variables contribute marginally 
when outliers are omitted in case of the discriminant analysis. As expected a great number of variables contribute to 
the classification of the two groups of companies when logit is employed. These variables are the following:  X5 
(Current Assets/Sales), X3 (Cash/ Total Assets), X1 (Net Income/Total Assets), X6 (Net Worth/Total Debt), and X10 
(Net Income/Sales).  Wilk’s lamda indicated that the model is rather discriminating.  
 
 
Table 3: Regression Coefficients (All Data) 
Panel A: All Data 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 -0.359 -3.539 
X2 -0.013 -0.883 
X3 -0.110 19.179 
X4 -1.254 0.871 
X5 -0.001 -14.232 
X6 0.000 -2.745 
X7 0.000 0.000 
X8 2.898 -0.682 
X9 -0.119 -0.013 
X10 0.742 -2.463 
X11 0.000 0.002 
 Eigenvalue=0.409 
Correlation=0.539 
Wilk' Lamda=0.710 
X
2
=159.855 
Significance=0.000 
X
2
=79.327 
Significance=0.000 
Wald Test=180.899 
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Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 -0.269 -4.920 
X2 -0.421 -0.981 
X3 -0.136 32.083 
X4 -0.317 0.137 
X5 0.160 -21.697 
X6 0.215 -5.265 
X7 0.159 -0.084 
X8 1.141 -0.514 
X9 -0.047 -0.011 
X10 0.590 -2.682 
X11 0.135 0.125 
 Eigenvalue=0.451 
Correlation=0.557 
Wilk' Lamda=0.689 
X
2
=138.262 
Significance=0.000 
X
2
=71.990 
Significance=0.000 
Wald Test=139.856 
 
 
 
As far as the correct classification is concerned, results reported in the next Table 4 justify the preference of 
logit against discriminant analysis but with discriminant analysis very close to logit.  Going-concern opinions can be 
predicted with a very high rate either with discriminant analysis or logit. 
 
 
Table 4: Classification Table For GROUP (Percent Correct-Overall Index) 
 
Panel A: All Data 
Discriminant Analysis Logit Model 
453 (99.3) 3 (0.7) 454 2 (99.6) 
11 (61.1) 7 (38.9) 9 9 (50.0) 
97.00% 97.70% 
 
Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
Discriminant Analysis Logit Model 
362 (98.9) 4 (1.1) 365 1 (99.7) 
8 (61.5) 5 (38.5) 4 9 (69.2) 
96.80% 98.70% 
 
 
This finding is very higher than other business paradigms (i.e. bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, etc.). 
Based on the above empirical findings, it is suggested that the prediction model is an accurate forecast of going-
concern opinions. 
 
TAX CONTINGENT LIABILITIES 
 
It should be noted that only 27% of firms make any disclosure of contingent tax liabilities and only 30% of 
firms that do disclose a tax contingency provide the detailed information required by SFAS No. 5 (Accounting for 
Contingencies).  According to Gleason et al. (2002) firms operating in litigious industries are more likely to disclose 
contingent tax liabilities, consistent with Skinner’s (1994) conclusion that disclosure reduces the cost of potential 
litigation.  In an IFRS framework using a sample of 80 German firms it was noted that deferred taxes comprise the 
most frequent adjustment item, reported in 95% of the observations.  Deferred taxes arise because IFRS eliminates 
tax-book conformity, which potentially affects every company (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007).  
 
In this study there are ninety eight companies with tax contingent liabilities and one hundred seventy seven 
companies without tax contingent liabilities.  The differences of means between the two groups of companies are 
focused on the following variables: X7 (Receivables/ Inventories), X11 (Sales/Working Capital), and X2 (Cash/Current 
Liabilities).  When outliers are excluded the differences are very moderate.  In both groups of companies outliers are 
presented in case of variables X11 (Sales/Working Capital), X7 (Receivables/Inventories), and X2 (Cash/ Current 
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Liabilities).  Descriptive statistics are available upon request.  All variables are non-normally distributed. Normality 
statistics are available upon request. 
 
The choice of the best fitting model is stressed through a discussion of all empirical findings drawn from a 
test of discriminant and logit.  Regression coefficients for each model and for each variable indicate that all variables 
contribute marginally in both discriminant analysis and the logit specification.  The point is that results are not 
statistically significant as in the other regressions made about problem companies and going-concern opinions. 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Coefficients (All Data) 
Panel A: All Data 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 0.518 1.321 
X2 0.565 0.018 
X3 -0.277 -3.515 
X4 0.246 0.553 
X5 0.367 1.180 
X6 -0.127 -0.017 
X7 0.452 0.001 
X8 -0.073 0.230 
X9 0.410 0.593 
X10 -0.518 -0.242 
X11 0.209 0.003 
 Eigenvalue=0.036 
Correlation=0.187 
Wilk' Lamda=0.965 
X
2
=16.543 
Significance=0.122 
X
2
=24.647 
Significance=0.010 
Wald Test=28.749 
 
 
 
Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
(Factor) Discriminant Coefficients Logistic Coefficients 
X1 0.714 1.744 
X2 0.545 0.140 
X3 -0.447 -1.984 
X4 0.240 0.358 
X5 0.668 0.965 
X6 -0.588 -0.139 
X7 -0.389 -0.034 
X8 -0.285 -0.087 
X9 0.444 0.370 
X10 -0.361 -0.246 
X11 -0.032 -0.008 
 Eigenvalue=0.030 
Correlation=0.171 
Wilk' Lamda=0.971 
X
2
=11.056 
Significance=0.439 
X
2
=13.738 
Significance=0.248 
Wald Test=26.830 
 
 
 
As far as the correct classification, results reported in next Table 6 justify the almost equivalent preference 
of discriminant analysis or logit.  It is worth noting that the rate of correct classification is moderate, very lower than 
the rate in the classification of problem companies or the rate for companies with going-concern opinions and lower 
than other business paradigms such as acquired companies, bankrupt companies, etc.   
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Table 6: Classification Table For GROUP (Percent Correct-Overall Index) 
 
Panel A: All Data 
Discriminant Analysis Logit Model 
207 (69.9) 89 (30.1) 288 8 (97.3) 
101 (56.7) 77 (43.3) 156 22 (12.4) 
59.90% 65.40% 
 
Panel B: Outliers Excluded 
Discriminant Analysis Logit Model 
139 (57.9) 101 (42.1) 236 4 (98.3) 
68 (49.3) 70 (50.7) 124 14 (10.1) 
55.30% 66.10% 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The prediction accuracy that was assessed in this study indicates that the models tested can operate as a 
decision support system with an effective aid to the auditors in their effort to form their judgments.  Most noticeable 
is the situation with going-concern opinions whereas over 96.0% accuracy was achieved. From a statistical point of 
view logit performed better than discriminant analysis with marginal differences in going-concern opinions but with 
great differences in problem companies classification and tax contingent liabilities.  This study is subject to 
limitations drawn from the fact that only publicly traded companies have been employed for a statistical analysis.  
The employment of privately held companies would make results capable of generalizing the figures. 
 
A great role in audit reports has been played by Audit Committees (ACs) internationally through the level 
of negotiation and the level of discussion in an auditor/client interaction. In Greece the institution of ACs rated as 
7% in 2005 and 17.36% in 2007 over the total number of ASE listed companies opens a new way for future research 
about the “black box”.  Concerns about the proposition that auditors act in the interest of managers that hire them 
rather than in the interest of investors in the framework of the adoption of IFRS is another area for research.  In 
Greece it is argued by ex-top execs that qualified audit reports have been eliminated after a long experience of 
substantial notes of auditors in audit reports.  On the other hand, the involvement of auditing firms at least in 
training programs to ASE listed companies in the transition to IFRS and the different accounting framework in 
which listed companies have been called to operate have left a “flight from audit quality” still for further 
investigation.  Another venue for research is the investigation of the effect of the wages and salary rates on hiring 
policies and decisions on engaging the auditing firms by the ASE listed companies.  A whole new area of further 
research would be to examine the behavior of internal auditors as it is compared with that of the external auditors 
and also the relationship and the effect of the internal control reports and the regular (external) auditing reports.  It 
would also be of interest to further investigate the effect of the transparency of auditing fees on auditing firms’ 
competition.  
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NOTES 
 
*There are at least three reasons for the very high percentage of unqualified audit reports: 
 
1. the auditors may not be competent to identify risks and therefore do not qualify (competence) 
2. auditors do not act independently so that their decision is influenced by other considerations such as the 
effect of qualification on  (a)the future prosperity of the client’s business or  (b)their own business in terms 
of possible litigation and loss of audit (independence) 
3. the annual reports are of high quality and simply do not need qualification.  
 
Bavishi (1993) showed that none of the audit reports from large Finnish companies in his study (35 and 50 from the 
years 1987 and 1990) contained a qualification.  
 
**The market’s responsiveness to an earnings announcement is measured by the slope coefficient (ERC) in the 
regression of unexpected returns on unexpected earnings. 
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Earnings persistence is measured by the extent to which the current earnings shock alters the market’s expectation of 
future earnings.  
 
***A firm was considered to have going-concern problems if it was likely that the firm would experience one or 
more of the following events within one year: 
 
 enter receivership 
 enter reorganization proceedings 
 inability to meet interest payments 
 experience its third consecutive year of substantial losses 
 liquidate its assets 
 experience its third consecutive year of significant deficits. 
 
A “going-concern opinion” is a special type of the subject-to opinion which indicates that the auditor believes the 
financial statement results to be fairly presented “subject-to” the resolution of the going-concern uncertainties.   
 
A “subject-to” opinion is issued when uncertainty exists about the outcome of a particular event; this includes the 
case where there are doubts about the continued existence of an entity. 
 
 
                                                 
 
